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The Constitution And The Ballot Box: 
Supreme Court Jurisprudence And Ballot 
Access For Independent Candidates 
Brian L. Porto* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Between 1968 and 1983, the United States Supreme Court 
decided eight cases in which the principal issue was the 
constitutionality of state-imposed restrictions on access to the 
general election ballot for independent and third-party 
candidates. 1 Those decisions spawned a small, but lively body 
of articles that criticized the Court's ballot access rulings for 
distinct, but related reasons.2 
Some political scientists argued that the Court's decisions 
frequently failed to consider the importance of restricted ballot 
access to the development of a strong two party political system 
and, in turn, the importance of strong two party politics to the 
preservation of representative democracy. 3 These comentators 
argued that the Court's decisions reduced the difficulty of ballot 
* Professor, Department of Political Science, Norwich University. 
1. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Illinois State Bd. of Elections 
v. Socialist Workers Party, 400 U.S. 173 (1979); American Party of Texas v. White, 
415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Lubin v. Panish, 415 
U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 
U.S. 431 (1970); and Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
2. Moeller, The Federal Courts' Involvement In The Reform Of Political Parties, 
40 W. PoL. Q. 717 (1987); Richard P. Roberts, Note, Ballot Access For Third Party 
And Independent Candidates After Anderson v. Celebrezze, 3 J. L. & POL. 127 
(1986); Tricia A. Blank, Note, Ballot Access Restrictions-Anderson v. Celebrezze, N. 
KY. L. REV. 137 (1985); Note, Strict Scrutiny of Ballot Access Restrictions Assures 
Easier Access for Independent Presidential Candidates, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
209 (1984); Thomas S. Chase, Note, Early Filing Deadline Unconstitutional: A 
Trend Toward Strict Scrutiny in Ballot Access Cases, 18 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 24 
(1984); McCleskey, Parties at The Bar: Equal Protection, Freedom of Association 
And The Rights of Political Organizations," 46 J. POL. 346 (1984); George 
Frampton, Jr., Challenging Restrictive Ballot Access Laws On Behalf Of The 
Independent Candidate, 10 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 131 (1980-81); Judith L. 
Elder, Access to the Ballot by Political Candidates," 83 DICK. L. REV. 387 (1979). 
3. See generally, Moeller, supra note 2; McCleskey, supra note 2. 
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qualification for independent candidates, thereby providing 
candidates an incentive to pursue the independent course, 
rather than to engage in the type of party politics that nurtures 
representative democracy.4 This phenomenon led one political 
scientist to observe, "It is now easier for third parties and 
independent candidates to enter the political contest and thus 
those candidates do not have to work through and support the 
political parties."5 
Another political scientist argued that the Court's ballot 
access decisions were inconsistent, therefore, their implications 
for political parties were difficult to discern.6 He observed that 
"[D]ecisions advantageous to parties are offset by those which 
impede their functioning and which discourage reliance on 
party politics."7 In this commentator's view, such inconsistency 
resulted from "considerable judicial confusion about the 
organizational prerequisites of democratic politics in general 
and of American politics in particular."8 
Legal commentators shared the view that the Court had 
failed to articulate a clear and consistent standard by which to 
judge the constitutionality of state ballot access restrictions.9 
Specifically, they complained that the Court appeared to rely 
on a different standard from one ballot access case to the next, 
"see-sawing" between standards from its decision in Williams v. 
Rhodes10 to its decision in Anderson v. Celebrezze. 11 Indeed, 
in Anderson, the Court left in doubt the appropriate standard 
of review in ballot access cases by citing approvingly cases 
representing conflicting standards of review. 12 
4. See, McCleskey, supra note 2 at 354 (referring to Anderson v. Celebrezze, 
460 u.s. 780 (1983)). 
5. Moeller, supra note 2, at 732. 
6. McClesky, supra note 2, at 354. 
7. !d. at 366. 
8. ld. at 367. 
9. This view has been expressed most recently in Bradley A. Smith, Judicial 
Protection Of Ballot-Access Rights: Third Parties Need Not Apply, 28 HARv. J. ON 
LEGIS. 167, 186-87 (1991); and Terry Smith, Election Laws And First Amendment 
Freedoms- Confusion And Clarification by the Supreme Court, 1988 ANN. SURVEY 
OF AM. L. 597, 610, 621-22 (1988). For earlier expressions of this view, see Note, 
Santa Clara L. Rev., supra, note 2 and Chase, supra note 2, at 26-27, 30. 
10. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
11. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). See also, Note, Santa Clara L. Rev., supra note 2, at 
215. 
12. See, Chase, supra note 2, at 30. 
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Unfortunately, neither political scientists nor legal 
commentators have paid close attention to the Supreme Court's 
ballot access jurisprudence since Anderson. 13 This is curious 
because between 1983, when the Court decided Anderson, and 
1992, the Court revisited the ballot access issue in Munro v. 
Socialist Workers Party/4 and Norman v. Reed,15 and has 
addressed, for the first time, the related matter of the 
constitutionality of a state's ban on write-in voting in Burdick 
v. Takushi. 16 The recent decisions clearly warrant an update 
of the Court's activity concerning ballot access and a 
reexamination of the aforementioned critiques. 
Moreover, events outside the courtroom of late have 
heightened the significance of ballot access jurisprudence. 
Republican presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan was 
unable to challenge President Bush in the April, 1992 New 
York Primary because he could not clear the formidable hurdle 
presented by New York State's ballot access lawY New York 
law required both the President and Mr. Buchanan to collect 
1,250 signatures in each of thirty-four (now thirty-one, after 
reapportionment) congressional districts in a period of 
approximately five weeks (December 31 to the first week in 
February) in order to gain a ballot position. 18 To make 
matters worse, once a Republican voter signed one candidate's 
petition, the law prohibited that voter from signing a petition 
for another candidate. 19 
By the time that Mr. Buchanan, who announced his 
candidacy in November, 1991, began to organize a petition 
drive, President Bush's petition drive was well underway; 
hence, many Republicans who might otherwise have signed a 
Buchanan petition were no longer eligible to do so.20 Mr. 
Buchanan thus failed to earn a spot on the primary election 
ballot.21 Democratic presidential candidate Paul Tsongas had 
13. The only recent scholarship concerning the ballot access cases decided after 
Anderson, which has been written exclusively by lawyers, is B. Smith, supra, note 
9, and T. Smith, supra, note 9. 
14. 479 U.S. 189 (1986). 
15. 112 S.Ct. 698 (1992). 
16. 112 S.CT. 2059 (1992). 
17. Gottlieb, New York Ballot Rules Help Clear Bush's Path, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 
7, 1992 at A22. 
18. !d. 
19. !d. 
20. !d. 
21. !d. 
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to go to court in order to secure a spot on New York's 
Democratic Primary ballot because of a "tortuous, line-by-line 
challenge from the New Alliance Party to the signatures on his 
[ballot] petitions.'722 He narrowly escaped Mr. Buchanan's fate 
in New York.23 
Independent presidential candidate H. Ross Perot 
expended a considerable amount of money in order to fund a 
Perot Petition Committee, the purpose of which was to secure 
him a position on the general election ballot in all fifty 
states.24 Due in part to his massive personal fortune, Mr. 
Perot achieved that goal, even in New York, where he had to 
open an office for the sole purpose of facilitating the gathering 
of twenty-thousand signatures, including one-hundred each 
from half of the state's congressional districts.25 None of the 
New York signatures could come from voters who had signed 
petitions for any of the candidates in the Democratic 
Presidential Primary or from any of the delegates who had 
been selected to attend the Republican National Convention. 26 
This commentary updates and reassesses Supreme Court 
ballot access jurisprudence. Section II identifies the principal 
forms of ballot access restriction that states employ, and briefly 
traces their historical development. Section III reviews the 
Court's ballot access decisions through Anderson v. Celebrezze, 
and Section IV discusses post-Anderson developments in the 
ballot access and write-in voting cases, respectively.27 
Section V argues that the Supreme Court's ballot access 
decisions have been substantially more consistent and better 
protect the two major political parties than political scientists 
and legal commentators have recognized. Section V argues that 
the Court has erred in this field-not by being overly solicitous 
of third party and independent candidates, but rather, by 
overvaluing the states' asserted policy interests in regulating 
22. Sam H. VerHovek, Election-Law Revisions: The Time May Be Now, NEW 
YORK TIMES, March 8, 1992 at A38. 
23. Rockefeller, Primaries Are a Protection Racket, NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 15, 
1992 at A27. 
24. Martin Gottlieb, Perot Forces Appear To Bend Election Barriers, NEW YORK 
TIMES, Apr. 28, 1992 at B1-B2. 
25. Id. at 131. 
26. Id. 
27. The decisions prior to and including Anderson are cited supra, note 1. The 
post-Anderson ballot access cases are Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698 (1992); and 
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986). The lone write-in voting 
case is Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992). 
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ballot access and undervaluing the First Amendment rights of 
voters to vote for the candidate of their choice. 
A similar argument concerning the Court's recent write-in 
voting decision follows in the Burdick discussion. This 
commentary recommends that, in ballot access cases the Court 
return to, and in write-in voting cases the Court adopt, the 
strict scrutiny of state ballot restrictions that it used in 
Williams v. Rhodes. 28 Section VI presents these conclusions 
and recommendation in summary form. 
II. BALLOT ACCESS RESTRICTIONS 
Typically, state ballot access statutes specify that parties 
that received a designated percentage or number of votes in the 
last general election will automatically be placed on the ballot 
for the succeeding general election.29 This means that most 
independent, new party and third party candidates, who 
commonly cannot meet the minimum vote requirement, must 
gather a predetermined number of signatures on nominating 
petitions in order to earn a ballot position.30 
Most often, the required number of signatures equals a 
specified percentage of either the registered voters in the State 
or the total number of votes cast in the previous general 
election.31 The required number varies considerably from state 
to state. As a result, placing a third party candidate for the 
United States Senate on the ballot in 1990 required anywhere 
from two-hundred signatures in New Jersey to 181,421 in 
Florida.32 In either case, a petition drive is necessary; indeed, 
the petition drive is the basic substantive obstacle to ballot 
access that third party and independent candidates face. 33 
Some states raise a hurdle that independent candidates 
must clear by imposing procedural restrictions on the gathering 
of petition signatures.34 Twelve states require persons who 
sign a petition to swear that they belong to the party named in 
the petition, that they will vote for the candidates listed, or 
that they will otherwise support the party's nominee.35 Texas 
28. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
29. B. Smith, supra, note 9, at 175. 
30. ld. 
31. ld. at 175-176. 
32. ld. at 176. 
33. ld. 
34. ld. 
35. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6430 (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 3001 
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and South Carolina require those persons who sign petitions to 
include on the petitions their voter affidavit numbers.36 
Similarly, Kentucky and Delaware require that the signers' 
social security numbers appear on the petitions.37 Eight states 
require independent and third party candidates who wish to 
appear on statewide ballots to obtain a certain number of 
signatures from different congressional or legislative 
districts.38 Seventeen states limit the time frame during 
which petition signatures may be gathered.39 
The limited petitioning period is typically accompanied by 
a filing deadline. The long petitioning period is made more 
stringent by a filing deadline for the general election that 
precedes the major party primaries, while a short petitioning 
period is made more generous by a filing deadline that is close 
to the general election.40 
(1981); HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-62 (a) (2) (Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-8-6-5 (5) 
(Burns Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, para. 10-2 (Smith-Hurd 1991); MD. 
ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 33, § 4B-1 (a) (1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-96 (6) (1987); 
N.J. REV. STAT. § 19:13-4 (West 1989); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-140 (McKinney 1978); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517-011 (Anderson 1988) (petition required by Secretary 
of State regulations); OR. REV. STAT. § 249.732 (1) (1991); and UTAH CODE ANN. § 
20-3-2.5(2)(b)(1) (Supp. 1991). 
36. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-11-80(3)(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); TEX. ELEC. 
CODE ANN. § 141.063(2)(b) (Vernon 1986). A voter affidavit number is the number 
given to a voter when the voter signs an affidavit to certify elegibility to register 
to vote in a particular state. The Texas statute has been held unconstitutional 
with respect to third parties, but the state has continued to enforce it against 
independent candidates. In September, 1990, the statute kept an independent 
candidate off the Texas ballot for failure to include affidavit numbers on her 
petitions. B. Smith, note 9, supra, at 177 n.48. 
37. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 3002(c)(2) (1981); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
118.315(2) (Michie! Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992). 
38. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.685(1) (West 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 
115.315(4) (Vernon Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-10-601(2) (1989); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 32-526(1) (1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 655.42(1) (1986); N.Y. ELEC. LAW 
§ 6-142.1 (McKinney 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-96(a)(2) (1987); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 24.1-168 (Mitchie Supp. 1989). · 
39. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-341C+6 (Supp. 1986) (10 days); ARK. STAT. 
ANN. § 7-7-103(c) (3) (Mitchie 1990) (60 days); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-4-801 (e)-(h) 
(Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.0955(1) (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 
21-2-170(e) (Mitchie 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, 'JI 10-4 (Smith-Hurd 1991) (90 
days); MD. ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 33, § 4B-1(a) (1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
168.685(1) (West 1989); MINN. STAT. § 204B.08 subd. 1 (Supp. 1989) (14 days); 
N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-138(4) (McKinney 1978) (6 weeks); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 
1-108(2) (West Supp. 1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2913 (Purdon Supp. 1992); 
R.I. GEN. LAW § 17-14-1 (Supp. 1992); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 181-006 (Vernon 
Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.1-168 (Mitchie Supp. 1992); WIS. STAT. § 8-
20(8)(a) (West 1986); WYO. STAT. § 22-4-201 (Supp. 1989). 
40. Roberts, note 2, supra, at 156-157. 
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The recent failure of environmental lawyer Larry 
Rockefeller to secure a ballot position for New York's 
Republican U.S. Senate Primary illustrates the combined 
challenge posed by the signature requirement and the limited 
petitioning period.41 Delays resulting from redistricting 
shortened the petitioning period to 18 days, during which New 
York law required Mr. Rockefeller to secure 10,000 
signatures. 42 
In addition to the hurdles described above, in 1980, 
independent presidential candidate John Anderson faced 
"disaffiliation" lawsY Disaffiliation laws deny general-election 
ballot access to independent candidates who have voted in the 
primary election immediately preceding the general election for 
which such candidates seek a ballot position. Even if 
independent candidates did not vote in the primary election 
immediately preceding the general election in which they seek 
candidacy, such candidates may be ineligible if they have been 
registered with a ballot-qualified political party within a 
specified period of time bMore the primary.44 
However onerous the above requirements may seem, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has often found them to be constitutional. 
A. History 
Statutory provisions of the type discussed above proliferat-
ed after the 1912 elections.45 In that year, former President 
Theodore Roosevelt's Progressive Party garnered a larger num-
ber of popular votes in the presidential election than did the 
Republican Party-voters elected fourteen Progressives to Con-
gress.46 The Socialist Party received a record six percent of 
the presidential vote, and a handful of Socialists won U.S. 
congressional seats. Additionally, Socialists captured 79 mayor-
alties and over 1200 other local offices throughout the United 
States.47 
State legislatures, frightened by Roosevelt's strong showing 
and by the post-World War I stirrings of the Communist Party, 
41. Rockefeller, supra note 19. 
42. ld. 
43. Frampton, note 2, supra, at 131. 
44. ld. 
45. One commentator referred to this election as the "last major hurrah" of 
third parties. Smith, note 9, supra, at 170. 
46. ld. 
47. ld. 
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enacted new, or fortified existing ballot access laws during the 
late 1910's and early 1920's. This resulted in ballot access be-
coming substantially more difficult for independent and third 
party candidates than for Democrat and Republican candi-
dates.48 
In the 1930's and 1940's, states enacted a second set of re-
strictive ballot access statutes, some of which explicitly banned 
the Communist Party. Others stopped at making ballot access 
more difficult for Communist and other non-traditional party 
and independent candidates by requiring large numbers of sig-
natures on nominating petitions.49 Occasionally, non-
traditional candidates challenged ballot-access statutes in state 
courts, but federal courts avoided the issues raised in those 
challenges until 1968.50 In that year, the Supreme Court re-
sponded to presidential candidate George Wallace's challenge to 
an Ohio law that threatened to keep him off that state's gener-
al election ballot. 51 
Since 1968, states have defended their ballot access restric-
tions on the basis of their interests in ensuring a stable politi-
cal system, an electoral victor supported by a majority of vot-
ers, and simple ballots that neither confuse voters nor discour-
age their political participation. 52 States have also argued that 
facilitating ballot access for the two major political parties and 
making access more difficult for third party and independent 
candidates serves their compelling interest in promoting politi-
cal stability.53 In the states' view, two-party dominance pro-
motes a moderate, stable politics of coalition formation and ac-
commodation instead of the ideological, unstable politics of 
fragmentation that is characteristic of multi-party political 
systems. 54 
Similarly, states have maintained that their interest in 
political stability warrants limiting the ballot access of third 
party and independent candidates because the presence of such 
candidates increases the likelihood that an election will fail to 
produce a winner who commands majority support.55 Finally, 
48. !d. at 173-74. 
49. !d., at 174. 
50. !d. 
51. ld. 
52. Elder, note 2, supra, at 390-99. 
53. !d., at 390-91. 
54. !d. 
55. !d., at 393. 
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states have contended that they have a compelling interest in 
preventing voter confusion and the voter apathy that might re-
sult from the presence of numerous marginal or even frivolous 
candidates on election ballots.56 This interest is supposedly 
served by limiting the ballot access of third party and indepen-
dent candidates whose candidacies are often marginal and/or 
frivolous. 57 
Ill. THE EARLY CASES: 1968-1983 
A. Williams v. Rhodes 
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality 
of ballot access restrictions in Williams v. Rhodes.58 At issue 
in Williams were several provisions of Ohio law that made it 
virtually impossible for any party to qualify for the general 
election ballot except the Republican and Democratic Par-
ties.59 Notable in Williams was the provision that candidates 
from new political parties seeking access to the general election 
ballot must file petitions signed by qualified electors totalling 
fifteen percent of the number of ballots cast in the preceding 
gubernatorial election.60 By contrast, the Democratic and Re-
publican Parties automatically retained their ballot positions if 
they obtained at least ten percent of the vote in the preceding 
gubernatorial election. 61 
Another provision required new parties to conduct primary 
elections "conforming to detailed and rigorous standards."62 As 
a result, George Wallace's American Independent Party (AlP) 
and the Socialist Labor Party were required to file their peti-
56. For a discussion of this argument, see !d., at 396. For an example of this 
argument, see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S., at 33. 
57. In Bullock 405 U.S., at 145, and Lubin, 415 U.S., at 715-16, the Supreme 
Court agreed with this argument, yet struck down required filing fees as means of 
pursuing the states' interest in avoiding voter confusion and apathy. The Lubin 
Court held that "[t]his legitimate state interest ... must be achieved by a means 
that does not unfairly or unnecessarily burden either a minority party's or an 
individual candidate's equally important interest in the continued availability of po-
litical opportunity." 415 U.S., at 716. The Court added that "the process of quali-
fying candidates for a place on the ballot may not constitutionally be measured 
solely in dollars." !d. 
58. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
59. !d., at 25 n.l. 
60. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.01 (Anderson 1968). 
61. 393 U.S., at 25-26. 
62. !d. at 27. 
290 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 7 
tions for inclusion on the Ohio Presidential ballot two months 
before the major party primaries and nine months prior to the 
general election. 63 
The AlP gathered substantially more than the required 
433,100 signatures, but failed to meet the early deadline. 
Hence, Ohio denied Wallace access to the ballot.64 The AlP 
responded by challenging the petition and primary requiremen-
ts, as well as the early filing deadline, on the ground that they 
denied the AlP and its supporters the equal protection of the 
laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.65 
Justice Black, writing for the six-member majority, ob-
served that the challenged statutory provisions burdened two 
different, but intimately related, constitutional rights. 66 First, 
the right of individuals to associate in order to advance shared 
political beliefs is protected. 67 Second, qualified voters have 
the right to cast their votes effectively, regardless of their polit-
ical persuasion. 68 Justice Black noted that "both of these 
rights, of course, rank among our most precious freedoms."69 
Consequently, the Court determined that strict scrutiny of 
Ohio's ballot access scheme was in order. 70 Under strict scruti-
ny, Ohio would be permitted to unequally burden non-major 
parties only if it could demonstrate a compelling interest was 
served.71 Moreover, even after proving a compelling interest, 
Ohio would also have to show that the challenged provisions 
were less restrictive of the rights to associate and vote effec-
tively than any available alternative.72 
In the Court's view, none of the four interests that Ohio 
asserted was sufficiently compelling to uphold the statute. 73 
The interest in promoting a two-party system failed because 
Ohio law favored not two-party politics generally, but rather, 
the Democrats and Republicans specifically. 74 In addition, O-
hio's two-party favoritism existed primarily because of the two 
63. ld. at 26-27. 
64. !d. 
65. ld. at 27. 
66. ld. at 30. 
67. !d. 
68. !d. 
69. !d. 
70. ld. at 31. 
71. !d. 
72. ld. at 31-33. 
73. ld. at :n. 
74. ld. at :n-32. 
--·-·--~--~~~~=~~~--------------------
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maJor parties' traditional prominence m American political 
life. 75 
The Court found Ohio's interest, which was to ensure that 
the general election winner was the choice of the majority, a 
legitimate one. 76 Even so, permitting Ohio to pursue that in-
terest by denying ballot access to a third party until that party 
is strong enough to win would deprive the party of the most 
effective means of building strength-namely, the opportunity 
to contest elections.77 
The interest in providing potential third party supporters 
with "a choice of leadership as well as issues"78 was not found 
compelling because "Ohio's burdensome procedures, requiring 
extensive organization and other election activities by a very 
early date, operate to prevent such a group from ever getting 
on the ballot."79 The Ohio system thus "denies the 'disaffected' 
not only a choice of leadership but a choice on the issues as 
well."80 
Finally, the interest in restricting the number of candi-
dates on the ballot in order to prevent voter confusion failed be-
cause the Court concluded that this danger was "no more than 
'theoretically imaginable."'81 Thus, the Court determined that 
Ohio's ballot access provisions imposed a burden on the voting 
and associational rights of third party supporters that amount-
ed to "invidious discrimination, in violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause."82 
B. Jenness v. Fortson 
Two years after deciding Williams the Supreme Court, in 
Jenness v. Fortson83 considered the constitutionality of 
Georgia's ballot access law. The Georgia statute prevented a 
candidate who had not entered and won a primary election 
from gaining access to the general election ballot until the 
candidate presented a nominating petition signed by five per-
75. !d. at 32. 
76. !d. 
77. !d. 
78. !d. 
79. !d. at 33. 
80. !d. 
81. !d. 
82. !d. at 34. 
83. 403 U.S. 431 (1970). 
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cent of the preceding election's registered voters. 84 The 
Jenness appellants were three candidates nominated by the 
Socialist Workers Party and two registered Georgia voters 
interested in a wider choice of candidates. They argued that 
the signature requirement abridged their First Amendment 
freedoms of speech and association.85 The appellants also ar-
gued that the signature requirement denied to third party 
candidates Fourteenth Amendment equal protection because 
primary winners were automatically printed on the general 
election ballot, whereas other candidates had to submit peti-
tions in order to secure a ballot position. 86 
Justice Stewart, writing for a unaminous Court in Jenness, 
rejected both of the appellants' arguments, principally because 
of the distinctions between the Ohio law at issue in Williams 
and the Georgia scheme. 87 Those distinctions caused the 
Court to reject the Williams strict scrutiny standard and to 
conclude that Georgia's asserted interest in requiring candi-
dates to demonstrate support in order to gain a ballot position 
justified the five percent signature rule. Justice Stewart ob-
served: 
There is surely an important state interest in requiring 
some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support 
before printing the name of a political organization's candi-
date on the ballot-the interest, if no other, in avoiding confu-
sion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process 
at the general election.88 
In Justice Stewart's view, the Georgia ballot access law 
served the above-mentioned goal without being unduly restric-
tive of First or Fourteenth Amendment rights.89 Unlike the 
Ohio law in Williams, the Georgia law: 1) provided for write-in 
votes, 2) permitted independent candidates, 3) set a reasonable 
deadline for the filing of signature petitions by candidates not 
endorsed by established parties, 4) permitted small and new 
parties to nominate candidates without establishing elaborate 
primary election mechanisms, 5) allowed voters to sign a peti-
tion for a third party candidate despite having signed others 
84. ld., at 432. 
85. ld. at 432 n.3; See also, id. at 434. 
86. ld. at 434. 
87. ld. at 438-42. 
88. ld. at 442. 
89. ld. at 432-42. 
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and to vote in a party primary despite having signed the peti-
tion of an independent candidate and 6) enabled candidates to 
submit petitions that contained non-notarized signatures.90 
Therefore, according to Justice Stewart, Georgia's ballot access 
laws, unlike Ohio's, did not "freeze the political status quo.',g1 
Not only did the five percent signature requirement pass the 
"freeze" test, it also passed muster on Equal Protection grounds 
because it was no more burdensome for a candidate to gather 
the signatures of five percent of the eligible electorate than it 
was to win a majority of the votes cast in a party primary.92 
Justice Stewart observed, "a candidate for Governor in 1966 
and a candidate for President in 1968 gained ballot designation 
[in Georgia] by nominating petitions, and each went on to win 
a plurality of the votes cast at the general election.',g3 
C. Storer v. Brown 
Four years after Jenness, the Court faced a First and Four-
teenth Amendment challenge to five provisions of the Califor-
nia Election Code in Storer v. Brown.94 Among other plain-
tiffs, two independent congressional candidates challenged a 
statutory provision that denied ballot positions to independent 
candidates who had been registered with a ballot-qualified 
political party within one year prior to the preceding prima-
ry.95 
The Court answered the petitioners' challenge by first ob-
serving that its decision in Williams v. Rhodes96 did not inval-
idate every substantial restriction on the rights to associate 
and vote.97 Justice White, writing for a six-member majority, 
noted that Williams was consistent with article I, section 2, 
clause 1 of the Constitution, which assigns to states the task of 
determining the qualifications of the voters who elect Cong-
ress.98 That constitutional provision states, "[t]he House of 
Representatives shall be composed of member chosen every 
second Year by the People of the several States, and the Elec-
90. !d. at 438-39. 
91. !d. at 438. 
92. !d. at 440-441. 
93. !d. at 4:39 n. 21-22. 
94. 415 U.S. 724 (1974). 
95. !d. at 726-27. 
96. 39:3 U.S. 23 (1968). 
97. Lubin, 415 U.S. at 729. 
98. !d. at 729-30. 
294 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 7 
tors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for 
Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State 
Legislature."99 
The Court also observed that article I, section 4, clause 1 
authorizes states to prescribe "[t]he Times, Places and Manner 
of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives."100 
Moreover, states must be permitted to regulate elections if elec-
tions are to be fair, honest and orderly, notwithstanding the 
strict judicial scrutiny of such regulations called for in Wil-
liams.101 
In the Court's view, the one-year disaffiliation requirement 
passed constitutional muster. 102 The disaffiliation re-
quirement satisfied Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 
requirements because it denied ballot access to independents, 
as well as party candidates, who had been affiliated with an-
other political party during the one-year time period. 103 The 
disaffiliation requirement also satisfied First Amendment scru-
tiny-it furthered California's compelling interest in preserving 
the stability of its political system, and this interest out-
weighed a candidate's interest in making a late decision to seek 
ballot access as an independent. 104 
· It is not clear, however, whether the disaffiliation require-
ment was also less restrictive than the alternative means of en-
suring political stability because the Court in Storer did not 
examine that traditional component of strict scrutiny. 105 It 
was sufficient for the Court that the rule prevented defeated 
primary candidates from running as independents in the gen-
eral election, thereby serving California's compelling interest in 
political stability. 106 Justice White reasoned, "[t]he general 
election ballot is reserved for major struggles; it is not a forum 
for continuing intraparty feuds."107 Consequently, California 
could limit its voters to participating in one of the two 
alternative procedures for nominating candidates to the general 
election ballot: (1) voting in a party primary, or (2) signing a 
99. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2 cl. 1. 
100. 41fi U.S. at 730 (citing art. I, § 4, cl. 1). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 736. 
103. ld. at 733-34. 
104. ld. at 736. 
10fi. Cf Williams, 39::! U.S. at 31-33. 
106. 415 U.S. at 735. 
107. Lubin, 41fi U.S. at 73fi. 
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petition for an independent candidate. 108 
D. American Party of Texas v. White 
The same day that the Court decided Storer, it also 
decided American Party of Texas v. White 109 , wherein Justice 
White wrote a majority opinion from which only Justice Doug-
las dissented. The petitioners were third parties and their 
candidates, qualified voters supporting those candidates, and 
independent candidates. 110 They claimed that several provi-
sions of the Texas Election Code violated their First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights to associate for the advancement of 
political beliefs, and invidiously discriminated against new and 
minority political parties and independent candidates.m 
Under Texas law, candidates for governor who had polled 
less than 200,000 votes but more than two percent of the total 
vote in the previous general election could qualify for the gen-
eral election ballot by winning the support of their respective 
parties at either a primary election or a nominating conven-
tion. 112 Parties whose candidates had polled less than two 
percent, as well as parties that had not nominated a candidate 
in the preceding gubernatorial election could still qualify for 
the general election ballot. 113 In these cases, a candidate qual-
ified if persons numbering one percent of the preceding general 
election votes demonstrated support at a precinct nominating 
convention or by means of petition signatures. 114 
The petitioners challenged the one percent support require-
ment and its attendant conventions and petition apparatus. 
They also challenged four other provisions of the Texas law: 
the ban on circulating petitions prior to the primary elections, 
the disqualification of voters who had voted in a party primary 
from signing a ballot access petition, the limitation of the sig-
nature-gathering period to fifty-five days and the requirement 
that all signatures be notarized.115 
The Court rejected the American Party's contention that 
108. The Court discusses the alternatives available to voters and candidates in 
California. ld. at 733-35. 
109. 415 u.s. 767 (1974). 
110. ld. at 770. 
111. ld. at 771. 
112. ld. at 778. 
113. ld. at 774. 
114. ld. at 777-78. 
115. ld. at 779. 
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the one percent support requirement and the accompanying 
convention and petition mechanisms discriminated against 
third parties and their candidates in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 116 It held that the convention/petition pro-
cess is no more burdensome to third parties than primary and 
runoff elections are to the major parties. 117 This is especially 
true "where the major party, in addition to the elections, must 
also hold its precinct, county and state conventions to adopt 
and promulgate party platforms and to conduct other busi-
ness."118 Similarly, it is no more burdensome to require third 
parties to demonstrate the support of one percent of the elec-
torate in order to secure a ballot position than it is to require 
the major parties to demonstrate significant support in the pre-
vious election in order to retain their ballot positions. 119 
The Court also rejected the petitioners' argument that the 
disqualification of primary voters from signing ballot petitions 
violated their First Amendment rights to associate and to vote 
effectively. It noted that a state "may determine that it is es-
sential to the integrity of the nominating process to confine 
voters to supporting one party and its candidates in the course 
of the nominating process."120 As it did in Storer, the Court in 
American Party departed from traditional strict scrutiny prin-
ciples by not inquiring whether the challenged ballot access 
limitation was less restrictive of First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights than all available alternatives. 121 The Court also 
rejected the petitioners' challenges to the fifty-five day peti-
tioning period, concluding that it was not unduly short, and 
their challenge to the notarization requirement, holding that it 
was the only means available of enforcing Texas's important 
interest in ensuring fair elections by preventing voters from 
voting twice. 122 
116. Id. at 780-81. 
117. Id. at 781. 
118. ld. 
119. ld. at 7R2-83. 
120. !d. at 786. 
121. Cf Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 31-33. 
122. American Party, 41fi U.S. at 786-87. 
281] Ballot Access 297 
E. Bullock v. Carter 
During the period that the Supreme Court decided Storer 
v. Brown and American Party of Texas v. White, it also decided 
two cases in which states had denied ballot access to candi-
dates who were unable to pay a required filing fee. In Bullock 
v. Carter, 123 the Court considered the claims of candidates for 
County Commissioner, County Judge and Land Office Com-
missioner. Those candidates challenged a Texas statute that 
made payment of a filing fee a prerequisite for inclusion on the 
primary ballot, alleging that the required filing fee violated the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments. 124 
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, ob-
served that because the Texas statute contained no reasonable 
alternative means of ballot access for the indigent candidate, it 
substantially limited voters' choices of candidates. The choices 
of less affluent voters, whose favorite candidates could be ex-
pected to be disproportionally burdened by the filing fee re-
quirement, were especially limited. 125 Conversely, the filing 
fee gave to the affluent disproportionate power to choose candi-
dates they favored. 126 This disparate impact on the exercise of 
the franchise occasioned strict scrutiny of the Texas law, 127 
although that scrutiny was arguably less strict than that em-
ployed in Williams v. Rhodes. 128 Unlike in Williams, where 
the Court had required Ohio to demonstrate a "compelling 
interest" (the traditional standard under strict scrutiny) in its 
ballot restrictions, the Bullock Court required Texas to show 
that its filing fee merely served "legitimate state objec-
tives."129 
Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the Texas filing fee 
was unconstitutional because it did not serve the legitimate 
state objectives of avoiding overcrowded ballots and preventing 
frivolous candidates from getting on the ballot. 130 The Texas 
rule, in basing ballot access upon a candidate's ability to pay a 
filing fee, potentially excluded some legitimate candidates from 
123. 405 U.S. 134 (1972). 
124. ld. at 135-37. 146. 
125. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144. 
126. ld. 
127. ld. at 144. 
128. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
129. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144. 
130. ld. at 146. 
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the ballot, but provided ballot access to arguably frivolous can-
didates who could afford the filing fee. 131 Justice Burger ob-
served: "If the Texas fee requirement is intended to regulate 
the ballot by weeding out spurious candidates, it is extraordi-
narily ill-fitted to that goal."132 
F. Lubin v. Parrish 
In Lubin v. Panish, 133 the Court considered the claim of 
an indigent candidate for County Supervisor. The candidate ar-
gued that a California statute requiring payment of a $701.60 
fee to appear on the primary election ballot, but that did not 
provide an alternative means of ballot access, violated his First 
Amendment freedoms of expression and association and his 
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the 
laws. 134 As in Bullock, the Lubin Court held that states have 
a legitimate interest in denying ballot access to frivolous candi-
dates. The Court held, however, that states cannot pursue that 
end through means that unfairly or unnecessarily burden the 
equally important interests of third parties and individual can-
didates in the continued availability of political opportuni-
ty.135 Like the Texas law in Bullock, the California law in 
Lubin failed the Court's test because it might operate to ex-
clude potentially serious candidates from the ballot, while si-
multaneously permitting a "wealthy candidate with not the 
remotest chance of election to secure a place on the ballot by 
writing a check."136 Thus, "in the absence of reasonable alter-
native means of ballot access, a State may not, consistent with 
constitutional standards, require from an indigent candidate a 
filing fee he cannot pay."137 
G. Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party 
Several years passed before the Court's next ballot access 
decision, which came in Illinois State Board of Elections v. So-
cialist Workers Party. 138 That case featured a challenge by 
131. !d. 
132. !d. 
133. 415 u.s. 709 (1974). 
134. !d. at 710. 
1:-!5. !d. at 716. 
136. !d. at 717. 
137. !d. at 718. 
138. 440 U.S. 173 (1979). 
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the Socialist Workers Party to several provisions of the Illinois 
Election Code on the ground that they violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 139 
One of the challenged provisions required new political 
parties and independent candidates seeking access to the gen-
eral election ballot in statewide elections to obtain the signa-
tures of 25,000 qualified voters. 140 A different requirement for 
the State's political subdivisions existed-the signatures of five 
percent of the number of persons who voted in an office's pre-
vious election. 141 The incongruous result of that dual stand-
ard was that in Chicago, a new party needed substantially 
more signatures (over 10,000 more in 1977) to gain access to 
the Chicago city ballot than it needed for access to the Illinois 
statewide election ballot. 142 
The Supreme Court responded to that incongruity with the 
clearest example of strict scrutiny since Williams v. 
Rhodes. 143 Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, 
observed that "voting is of the most fundamental significance 
under our constitutional structure"144 and that where a right 
so fundamental as the right to vote is at stake, "a State must 
establish that its classification is necessary to serve a compel-
ling interest."145 Moreover, even when pursuing a legitimate 
interest, such as requiring ballot aspirants to demonstrate the 
modicum of popular support that befits a "serious" candidate, 
States must adopt the least drastic means of achieving their 
ends. 146 
The signature requirements for new parties and indepen-
dent candidates pursuing offices in Chicago were clearly not 
the least restrictive means of attaining the State's legitimate 
aim of avoiding a ballot overloaded with candidates. 147 There 
was no reason at all, let alone a compelling reason, why that 
goal could only be achieved by erecting a substantially higher 
139. !d. at 17fi-78. 
140. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, para. 10-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978) required indi-
viduals desiring to form a new political party throughout the state to file with the 
State Board of Elections a petition "signed by not less than 25,000 qualified vot-
ers." See also Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 175, n. 1. 
141. 440 U.S. at 175-176. 
142. !d. at 183-84. 
143. Williams, 393 U.S. 23. 
144. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184. 
14fi. !d. 
146. !d. at 18fi. 
147. !d. at 186. 
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minimum signature requirement for Chicago's municipal elec-
tions than for statewide contests in Illinois. 148 The Court con-
cluded, "the Illinois Election Code is unconstitutional insofar as 
it requires independent candidates and new political parties to 
obtain more than 25,000 signatures in Chicago."149 
H. Anderson v. Celebrezze 
The Court's next ballot access decision came in Anderson v. 
Celebrezze, 1" 0 the last and perhaps the most important deci-
sion addressed in this section. It is significant because it marks 
the abandonment of the strict scrutiny standard upon which 
the Court had relied only four years earlier in Illinois State 
Board of Elections, in favor of a considerably more nebulous 
"balancing" standard. 151 
The question presented in Anderson was whether Ohio's 
early deadline for the filing of declarations of candidacy by 
independent candidates had placed an unconstitutional burden 
on the voting and associational rights of the supporters of inde-
pendent presidential candidate John Anderson. 152 On April 
24, 1980, when Mr. Anderson abandoned his quest for the nom-
ination of the Republican Party and announced his indepen-
dent candidacy, Ohio's statutory deadline for filing a statement 
of candidacy had passed. Hence, when Mr. Anderson's support-
ers presented Ohio Secretary of State Celebrezze with a nomi-
nating petition and a statement of candidacy on May 16, 1980, 
Mr. Celebrezze refused to accept the documents. 153 
Justice Stevens, writing for a five-member majority, an-
nounced a three-part balancing test for cases presenting con-
stitutional challenges to election laws. 154 The new test would 
require the Court to: 1) consider the character and magnitude 
of the asserted injury to First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights; 2) identify and evaluate the precise interests put for-
ward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by 
its rule; and 3) determine the legitimacy and strength of each 
of those interests and consider the extent to which such inter-
14R. ld. 
149. ld. at 187. 
150. 460 U.S. 7HO (19R8). 
1fil. ld. at 788-89. 
152. !d. at 782. 
1fia. !d. at 782-K1. 
1fi4. !d. at 789. 
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ests make it necessary to burden the petitioner's individual 
rights. 155 
In adopting the new test, the Court abandoned strict scru-
tiny, as well as the equal protection analysis of which strict 
scrutiny is part. 156 Equal protection analysis focuses on the 
alleged discriminatory impact of a particular ballot-access re-
striction upon particular groups, such as third parties, indepen-
dent candidates or indigent candidates. 157 The Court replaced 
this equal protection focus in Anderson with a due process ap-
proach which tried to determine whether the interests asserted 
by the State in restricting ballot-access were sufficiently power-
ful and well-served by specific First Amendment restrictions 
enacted to render such restrictions constitutional. 158 
Applying the first prong of the new test, the Court ob-
served that Ohio's early filing deadline for independent candi-
dates inflicts a serious injury on First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights by excluding from the general election ballot 
a late-emerging independent presidential candidate whose 
issue positions could command widespread community supp-
ort.159 In this way, the Ohio law "denies the 'disaffected' not 
only a choice of leadership but a choice on the issues as 
well."160 Moreover, the Ohio early-filing deadline places a sig-
nificant State-initiated restriction on a national election. This 
restriction seems unjustified since the State has a substantially 
less important interest in regulating presidential elections than 
in regulating statewide or local elections. 161 
Under the second prong of the new test, the Court rejected 
Ohio's argument that its interest in voter education necessitat-
ed the early filing deadline. 162 The Court observed, "[i]n the 
modem world it is somewhat unrealistic to suggest that it 
takes more than seven months to inform the electorate about 
the qualifications of a particular candidate simply because he 
lacks a partisan label."163 It also rejected Ohio's argument 
that its early filing deadline treats all candidates alike by re-
155. ld. 
156. Cf Williams, 393 U.S. at 30-31. 
157. ld. 
158. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789. 
159. ld. at 792. 
160. ld. 
161. ld. at 795. 
162. ld. at 796. 
163. ld. at 797. 
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quiring candidates participating in primaries to file their dec-
larations of candidacy on the same date that independents file 
theirs. 164 The Court noted that the need to hold primaries 
well in advance of the national party nominating conventions 
justifies early filing deadlines for primary candidates, but that 
no such need exists with regard to independent candidates in a 
general election. 165 Finally, the Court rejected Ohio's conten-
tion that its interest in political stability warranted the early 
filing deadline, noting that the State's interest in stability is 
considerably less in a presidential election than in a statewide 
or local election. "[N]o State could singlehandedly assure 'politi-
cal stability' in the Presidential context."166 
In disposing of Ohio's arguments, the Court employed the 
third prong of its balancing test and concluded that the inter-
ests asserted by Ohio did not justify the injuries inflicted by 
Ohio's early filing deadline. 167 That conclusion was by no 
means a total victory for independent candidates, nor was it a 
stunning defeat for State interests. It most certainly was not 
"anti-party." The due process approach used in Anderson accor-
ds greater weight to State interests than strict scrutiny/equal 
protection analysis did and it endeavors to balance State inter-
ests against voters' First Amendment rights instead of almost 
automatically subordinating the former to the latter. 168 
IV. THE RECENT CASES: 1986-1992 
A. Munro v. Socialist Workers Party 
The Supreme Court's first ballot-access decision after An-
derson came in Munro v. Socialist Workers Party. 169 At issue 
in Munro was a Washington state statute that required third-
party candidates for offices subject to partisan elections to 
receive at least one percent of the primary votes in order to 
secure a ballot position in the general election. 170 The nomi-
nee of the Socialist Workers Party for United States Senator, 
164. ld. at 799. 
165. ld. at ROO. 
166. ld. at 804. 
167. ld. at 796-806. 
168. Note, Anderson v. Celebrezze: The Ascendancy Of The First Amendment In 
Ballot Access Cases, 15 TOLEDO L. REV. 363, 400 (1983). 
169. 479 U.S. 189 (1986). 
170. ld. at 191-92 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 29.18.110 (1985)). 
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who had qualified for the primary ballot but failed to qualify 
for the general election ballot, joined the Party in arguing that 
the one percent requirement violates the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 171 
Justice White, writing for a seven-member majority, reit-
erated what the Court had noted in Jenness, American Party 
and Anderson, namely, that states possess an "undoubted right 
to require candidates to make a preliminary showing of sub-
stantial support in order to qualify for a place on the bal-
lot."172 That state interest is so powerful, according to the 
Munro Court, that a state need not prove prior voter confusion, 
overcrowded ballots or the prevalence of frivolous candidacies 
in order to justify the imposition of "reasonable ballot access 
restrictions" like Washington's one percent rule. 173 As a re-
sult, a state that enacts such a rule is not only spared strict 
judicial scrutiny of that rule, thanks to Anderson, but, after 
Munro, is also spared from having to make a particularized 
showing of damage to its electoral process absent the rule. 174 
Applying that standard, the Munro Court upheld the 
Washington statute. The Court observed, ''Washington was 
clearly entitled to raise the ante for ballot access, to simplify 
the general election ballot, and to avoid the possibility of unre-
strained factionalism at the general election."175 Moreover, 
requiring a third-party candidate to receive one percent of the 
primary vote in order to secure a position on the general elec-
tion ballot is no more onerous than the customary requirement 
of obtaining petition signatures. 176 This is especially true in 
Washington, which conducts a "blanket primary" where regis-
tered voters may vote for any candidate of their choice, regard-
less of the candidate's political party affiliation. This procedure 
enables third party candidates to seek support from the entire 
pool of registered voters in the State. 177 For all these reasons, 
the Court concluded in Munro that Washington's one percent 
rule satisfied the requirements of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 178 
171. ld. at 192·93. 
172. ld. at 193-94. 
173. ld. at 195-96. 
174. ld. at 195-96. 
175. ld. at 196. 
176. !d. at 197. 
177. [d. 
178. ld. at 197-98. 
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B. Norman v. Reed 
The Supreme Court's most recent ballot-access decision 
came in Norman v. Reed. 179 At issue in Norman was the con-
stitutionality of an Illinois law that regulated ballot access for 
new political parties. 180 The petitioners, who had organized 
the Harold Washington Party, named for the late Mayor of Chi-
cago, sought to expand the party's influence by running for 
various offices in Cook County, of which Chicago is part, in No-
vember, 1990.181 
The Party had previously contested elections only in the 
City of Chicago, hence, Illinois law required it to qualify as a 
"new party" in order to contest countywide elections. 182 In 
order to qualify, the petitioners were required to obtain 25,000 
petition signatures from each of Cook County's two districts, 
the "city district," encompassing Chicago, and the "suburban 
district," encompassing the remainder of the County. 183 They 
gathered 44,000 signatures in the city district, but only 7,800 
signatures in the suburban district. This shortfall precipitated 
a challenge to the petition and to the slate of candidates they 
filed with the Cook County Electoral Board. 
Justice Souter, writing for a seven-member majority, made 
it clear that strict scrutiny of laws that restrict ballot access is 
not dead. 184 He observed that the freedom of association guar-
anteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments protects the 
right of citizens to create and develop new political parties. 185 
To "thwart this interest by limiting the access of new parties to 
the ballot,"186 states must demonstrate "a corresponding in-
terest sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation"187 and any 
severe restriction on the freedom of association must be "nar-
rowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling impor-
tance."188 
Applying this standard, the Court first reversed the Illinois 
179. 112 S. Ct. 698 (1992). 
180. !d. at 702. 
181. ld. 
182. !d. at 703. 
183. See !d. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, para 10-2 (Smith-Hurd 1989). 
184. ld. at 705. 
18fi. !d. 
186. ld. 
187. !d. 
188. !d. 
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Supreme Court's ruling that the petitioners were prohibited by 
state law from representing the ''Harold Washington Party" in 
countywide elections because there already was a party by that 
name in the City of Chicago. 189 According to the Illinois Su-
preme Court, Illinois law190 prohibited the petitioners from 
running in county elections under the banner of the Harold 
Washington Party because its Chicago component was "an 
established political party."191 
Justice Souter observed that the Illinois Supreme Court's 
reading of the statutory prohibition of the use of the name of 
an established party was so "draconian" as to bar candidates 
running in one political subdivision from using the name of a 
political party established only in another political subdivis-
ion.192 Therefore, unless a new party possessed the resources 
to run a statewide campaign, it would be permanently fore-
closed from contesting elections outside the political subdivision 
in which it was established. 193 Such foreclosure hardly consti-
tuted the narrowly tailored means of achieving Illinois's legiti-
mate interests in preventing electoral fraud and voter confu-
sion required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 194 
Illinois could have avoided these ills merely "by requiring the 
candidates to get formal permission to use the name from the 
established party they seek to represent, a simple expedient for 
fostering an informed electorate without suppressing the 
growth of small parties."195 
Similarly, the Court reversed the decision of the Illinois 
Supreme Court that disqualified the Harold Washington Party 
from contesting Cook County elections for failure to gather 
25,000 petition signatures in both the urban and suburban dis-
tricts of the County. 196 In the High Court's view, Illinois 
failed to choose the least restrictive means of advancing its 
legitimate interest in requiring candidates to demonstrate a 
reasonable distribution of support throughout a county. 197 
1R9. !d. at 705-706. 
190. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, para. 10-5 (1989) (states in part "[a] political party 
shall not bear the same name as, nor include the name of any established political 
party."). 
191. Norman, 112 S. Ct. at 705. 
192. !d. at 706. 
193. !d. 
194. !d. 
195. !d. 
196. !d. at 707-08. 
197. !d. at 708. 
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Justice Souter noted that after Illinois State Board of Elections, 
the Illinois Legislature had amended its ballot-access statute to 
cap at 25,000 the number of petition signatures required to be 
gathered by a new political party within any district or political 
subdivision. 198 
Under the amended law, a new political party wishing to 
field candidates in a large county not divided into districts 
would need to gather no more than 25,000 petition signa-
tures.199 The amended law was designed to comply with the 
decision in Illinois State Board of Elections, which forbade Illi-
nois from requiring candidates seeking ballot access in Cook 
County from having to gather twice as many signatures as 
were necessary for a statewide race. 200 
In Justice Souter's view, the Illinois Supreme Court ign-
ored both the rule announced in Illinois State Board of Elec-
tions and the intent of the Illinois Legislature when it inter-
preted paragraph 10-2 of the Illinois Revised Statutes201 to 
require the Harold Washington Party to gather 25,000 signa-
tures from each of Cook County's districts for a total of 50,000 
signatures.202 The best support for Justice Souter's conclusion 
is that the 50,000 signatures required of the Harold Washing-
ton Party in Cook County amounted to twice the number the 
Party would have been required to gather for ballot access in a 
statewide race.203 Moreover, in a statewide race, unlike in a 
Cook County race, the Party could have collected all 25,000 
signatures in the City of Chicago.204 Justice Souter acknowl-
edged that Illinois was entitled to require a new party to dem-
onstrate a fair distribution of support throughout Cook County 
in order to get on the ballot. However, he concluded that to do 
so in a constitutional manner, Illinois should have "required 
some minimum number of signatures from each of the compo-
nent districts while maintaining the total signature require-
ment at 25,000."205 
198. !d. at 707. 
199. /d. 
200. !d. 
201. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, para. 10-2 (Smith-Hurd 1989). 
202. Norman, 112 S. Ct. at 707. 
203. !d. 
204. /d. at 708. 
205. /d. 
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C. Burdick v. Takushi 
The Supreme Court also ventured into the related field of 
write-in vote cases in 1992, when it decided Burdick v. 
Takushi. 206 At issue in Burdick was Hawaii's prohibition on 
write-in voting. The petitioner argued that this prohibition 
infringed unreasonably upon its citizens' rights under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments.207 In the petitioner's view, the 
United States Constitution required Hawaii to provide for the 
casting, tabulation and publication of write-in votes. 208 
Justice White, writing for a six-member majority, began 
his opinion by observing that although ''voting is of the most 
fundamental significance under our constitutional structure," it 
does not necessarily follow that any burden placed on the right 
to vote must be subject to strict scrutiny or that the right to 
vote in any manner and the right to associate politically 
through the ballot are absolute.209 He added that to examine 
every voting regulation with strict scrutiny and require it to be 
narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state interest 
"would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections 
are operated equitably and efficiently."210 Instead, a court 
faced with a challenge to a state election law should weigh the 
gravity of the constitutional injury asserted against the justifi-
cations offered by the State, using the Anderson balancing 
test. 211 Thus, in the same year the Court applied strict scruti-
ny in Norman, it used the Anderson balancing test in Burdick 
to decide, even though petitioners in both cases claimed that 
their rights to associate for political purposes and to vote effec-
tively had been infringed. 212 
The Burdick Court concluded that Hawaii could ban write-
in voting, partly because the ban imposed only a "very limited" 
burden on constitutional rights. 213 Hawaii law provides three 
mechanisms by which the candidate of one's choice can gain a 
ballot position, including a nonpartisan primary for candidates 
206. 112 S.Ct. 1059 (1992). 
207. ld. at 2061. 
208. !d. 
209. !d. at 2062-3 (citing Illinois, 440 U.S. at 184). 
210. [d. at 2063. 
211. !d. 
212. Cf. Norman, 112 S. Ct. at 705. 
213. Bundick, 112 S. Ct. at 2065. 
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unaffiliated with any political party.214 Those options assure 
disaffected voters a sufficient vehicle for political expression. 
Hence, the Constititution does not compel Hawaii to furnish 
the additional option of casting a write-in vote.215 
Moreover, Hawaii's interests in restricting the size of the 
general election ballot, averting divisive, "sore-loser" candida-
cies by unsuccessful primary contestants, and preventing "par-
ty raiding" (the organized switching of blocs of voters from 
Party A to Party B in order to manipulate the results of Party 
B's primary) are sufficient to outweigh the limited burden that 
the write-in voting ban imposes upon Hawaii's voters.216 In-
deed, Justice White closed the majority opinion by stating that 
whenever a State's ballot access laws impose the light burden 
on constitutional rights that Hawaii's do, if that State also 
bans write-in voting, the ban will be presumptively valid.217 
V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Supreme Court's ballot-access jurisprudence has been 
more consistent and more favorable to the two major political 
parties than the political science and legal commentaries indi-
cate. Careful examination reveals that regardless of the stan-
dard used, the Court has consistently supported the constitu-
tional claim of a third party or independent candidate only in 
cases where the challenged ballot-access restrictions served no 
arguably legitimate state interest, let alone a compelling one, 
and virtually precluded electoral activity by those candidates. 
The Court has consistently decided the "easy" cases, featuring 
excessively burdensome restrictions on ballot access, in favor of 
the "outsiders." The "easy" cases are Williams, Bullock, Lubin, 
Illinois State Board of Elections, Anderson, and Norman. The 
Supreme Court has just as consistently decided the ''hard" cas-
es, presenting more narrowly tailored restrictions, in favor of 
the state and, in turn, the Democrat and Republican Parties. 
The cases of Jenness, Storer, American Party, Munro, and 
Burdick illustrate this point. 
214. ld. at 2064. 
215. ld. at 2066. 
216. ld. 
217. ld. at 2067. 
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A. The Williams-Anderson Line of Cases 
Certainly Ohio's requirements, invalidated in Williams, 
that new parties present petitions signed by a number of qual-
ified electors equal to fifteen percent of the ballots cast in the 
preceding general election and conduct primary elections, and 
that their presidential candidates file petitions for ballot posi-
tions were overdrawn and punitive.218 These provisions pre-
cluded the post-primary emergence of an alternative candidate 
in response to voter dissatisfaction with the major party nomi-
nees. 
The Texas and California filing fees that the Court struck 
down in Bullock and Lubin were overdrawn because they con-
ditioned ballot access upon the candidate's ability to pay the 
requisite fee, a condition wholly unrelated to the seriousness of 
the candidate or the degree of that candidate's public support. 
A wealthy, frivolous candidate could readily gain access to the 
ballot, but a serious candidate of limited means might be de-
nied access.219 Moreover, the fees discriminated against can-
didates who could not draw upon political party resources, 
thereby placing a disproportionally heavy burden on third par-
ty and independent candidates. 
The Illinois geographic distribution requirements for peti-
tion signatures invalidated in Illinois State Board of Elections 
and Norman were similarly flawed. The Court found that both 
Illinois laws were overdrawn, if not irrational, because they 
required new political parties to demonstrate substantially 
more support in order to qualify for the general election ballot 
in a political subdivision than to qualify for the statewide ballot 
in the state of which that subdivision is part.220 No legitimate 
electoral purpose is achieved by requiring a new political party 
to secure 10,000 more petition signatures for a Chicago election 
than for a statewide election in Illinois, as did the statutory re-
striction struck down in Illinois State Board of Elections.221 
Similarly, there is no legitimate electoral purpose to be 
achieved by requiring a new party to gather 25,000 more peti-
tion signatures for a Cook County election than for a statewide 
218. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
219. Lubin, 415 U.S. at 717; See also Bullock, 405 U.S. at 146. 
220. See generally Norman, 112 S. Ct. 698 (1992); Illinois State Board of Elec-
tions, 440 U.S. at 177, n. 3. 
221. See Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 175, n. 1 (citing ILL. ANN. 
STAT. ch. 46 (Smith-Hund 1978) 
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election, as did the Illinois Supreme Court's statutory inter-
pretation voided in Norman. 222 Moreover, the geographic dis-
tribution requirements frustrated the efforts of candidates who 
were neither Democrats nor Republicans to gain access to the 
ballot in Chicago and Cook County. 
Even Ohio's March filing deadline, which provoked a 5-4 
split of the Anderson Court, lacked any legitimate electoral 
purpose. Admittedly, the deadline date was later than the Feb-
ruary 7 date invalidated in Williams and it was not accompa-
nied by the party organizational requirements that George 
Wallace had successfully challenged in Williams. 223 N everthe-
less, like its predecessor, the filing deadline challenged in An-
derson prevented an independent candidate from launching a 
post-primary drive for the Presidency as a result of the 
candidate's and the public's dissatisfaction with the Democrat 
and Republican nominees. Surely, in the modern era of mass 
communications, it is unnecessary to require independent pres-
idential candidates to declare their intentions four or five 
months prior to the nominations of their major party opponents 
in order to serve a state's asserted interest in voter educat-
ion.224 
B. The Jenness-Burdick Line of Cases 
In contrast to the ballot-access restrictions discussed, the 
restrictions the Court upheld in Jenness, Storer, American 
Party and Munro, and the write-in voting ban it affirmed in 
Burdick, cannot be summarily rejected as overdrawn, irrational 
or punitive. State laws requiring third party and independent 
candidates to demonstrate a modicum of public support, either 
by means of petition signatures as in Jenness and American 
Party or primary votes as in Munro to gain ballot access bear a 
rational relationship to a state's legitimate interest in keeping 
frivolous or fraudulent candidates off the ballot. Similarly, a 
law requiring independent candidates to disaffiliate from politi-
cal parties for a statutorily prescribed period as in Storer is 
222. Norman, 112 S. Ct. at 707. 
223. The deadline date at issue in Anderson was March 20; regarding the party 
organizational requirements that Governor Wallace challenged in Williams, See 
Williams 393 U.S. at 25, n. 1. 
224. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 797. 
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rationally related to a state's interest in avoiding repeating the 
primaries by preventing losers of primaries from running inde-
pendently in immediately succeeding general elections. A law 
banning write-in voting as in Burdick is also reasonable, espe-
cially where the state's other ballot laws afford a variety of 
mechanisms by which third party and independent candidates 
can readily gain access to the ballot. 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Supreme 
Court's ballot access jurisprudence has been neither inconsis-
tent nor anti-party, as political science and legal commentators 
have charged.225 Despite using different legal standards in 
different cases, the Court has consistently favored the constitu-
tional claims of third party and independent candidates when 
state ballot-access restrictions served no legitimate electoral 
interest and were obviously designed to keep candidates other 
than Democrats and Republicans off the ballot. The Court has 
been equally consistent in favoring the electoral interests of the 
states when the ballot access restrictions challenged could be 
credibly defended as necessary to some legitimate state pur-
pose. This treatment has benefitted the Democrat and Republi-
can parties by making it more difficult for third party and inde-
pendent candidates to challenge Democrats and Republicans in 
general elections and for voters dissatisfied with the two major 
parties to cast write-in votes for non-traditional candidates. 
Although the Court cannot be criticized for inconsistency or 
for hostility to the two major political parties, it should be criti-
cized for underestimating the importance of the plaintiffs in-
terests and for overestimating the importance of the asserted 
state interests in the Jenness-Burdick line of cases. In Jenness, 
the Court upheld Georgia's requirement that non-ballot-quali-
fied parties submit nominating petitions signed by at least five 
percent of the State's registered voters. Unlike the Ohio law 
invalidated in Williams, the Georgia law offered a realistic pos-
sibility for third party and independent candidates to obtain a 
place on the ballot.226 The Georgia statute, unlike its Ohio 
counterpart, did not prohibit write-in voting or independent 
candidacies, nor did it require third parties to establish elabo-
rate party machinery.227 
Nevertheless, Georgia's signature requirement was argu-
225. See supra, note 2. 
226. Williams, 403 U.S. at 438. 
227. ld. 
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ably as punitive as Ohio's because Ohio's provision called for 
signatures amounting to fifteen percent of the ballots cast in 
the previous election, whereas Georgia's called for signatures 
equal to five percent of a typically much larger number, name-
ly, registered voters. 228 Georgia's ballot retention rule was al-
so more stringent than Ohio's. Once a party was ballot-quali-
fied in Ohio, it could remain so by receiving ten percent of the 
vote in the succeeding election, while in Georgia, a party had to 
receive twenty percent of the vote in order to remain ballot-
qualified.229 Finally, while an Ohio party could qualify all of 
its candidates for the ballot by filing one petition, a Georgia 
party wishing to nominate a full complement of candidates for 
state constitutional offices plus both houses of Congress had to 
obtain signatures on fourteen separate petitions.230 If the 
Georgia scheme did not, like its Ohio counterpart, "freeze the 
political status quo," surely it solidified the status quo, that is, 
Democrat and Republican supremacy, sufficiently to merit the 
same result the Court had reached in Williams.231 
In Storer, the Court upheld California's one year party dis-
affiliation requirement because it regarded as "compelling" the 
State's interest in preventing candidates who had lost party 
primaries from gaining ballot-access for general elections as 
independents. 232 Indeed, the Court was so convinced of the 
gravity of the State's interest that it ignored the customary 
follow-up inquiry under strict scrutiny, namely, whether less 
drastic means were available to achieve the State's inter-
est.233 Had it made that inquiry, the Court might well have 
concluded that California could achieve the same end merely by 
prohibiting candidates who had lost party primaries from run-
ning as independents in immediately succeeding general elec-
tions. Such a rule would serve the State's asserted interest in 
avoiding primary re-runs, yet still permit general election bal-
lot-access for a candidate who had recently, but sincerely, re-
nounced party affiliation in favor of political independence. 
In American Party, the gravity of Texas's interest in en-
suring that "political parties appearing on the general ballot 
228. B. Smith, supra note 9, at 182. 
229. !d. at 183. 
230. !d. 
231. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 438. 
232. Storer, 415 U.S. at 735. 
233. !d. at 736. 
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demonstrate a significant, measurable quantum of community 
support" similarly impressed the Court.234 As a result, the 
Court did not inquire whether the State could achieve that aim 
by means less constitutionally restrictive than requiring new 
parties to: 1) hold precinct nominating conventions and 2) gath-
er petition signatures equalling one percent of the previous 
gubernatorial vote within 55 days, after the major party prima-
ries, and exclusively from voters who had neither voted in a 
primary nor signed another nominating petition. 235 Had the 
Court so inquired, it might well have determined that the one 
percent signature requirement, standing alone, sufficiently 
demonstrated a new party's "community support," and the 
additional requirements only hindered ballot-access for third-
parties. 
In Munro, the Court stated that states possess an "undoub-
ted right to require candidates to make a preliminary showing 
of substantial support in order to qualify for a place on the 
ballot."236 That right derives from the states' interests in 
avoiding confusion, deception and frustration of the democratic 
process at the general election.237 Those interests are so pow-
erful, in the view of the Munro Court, that states need not 
demonstrate actual voter confusion, ballot overcrowding or 
frivolous candidacies in order to justify the imposition of "rea-
sonable restrictions on ballot access."238 Thus, Washington's 
requirements that third parties nominate candidates prior to 
the State's blanket primary and that those candidates receive 
at least one percent of the votes cast for their respective offices 
in the primary in order to appear on the general election ballot 
passed constitutional muster.239 
In Munro, as in Storer and American Party, the Court 
accepted a state's interest in regulating ballot access as impor-
tant, but neglected to make the necessary inquiry whether the 
234. American Party, 415 U.S. at 782. 
235. Id. at 779. After examining each of the challenged provisions of the Texas 
statute, the Court concluded that "Texas in no way freezes the status quo, but 
implicitly recognizes the potential fluidity of American political life. Jenness u. 
Fortson, 403 U.S. at 439. It affords minority political parties a real and essentially 
equal opportunity for ballot qualification. Neither the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments nor the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires any 
more." ld. at 787. 
236. Munro, 479 U.S. at 194 (citing Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788-789). 
237. ld. 
238. Id. at 195. 
239. Id. at 199. 
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means employed to achieve the State's interest was the least 
restrictive alternative.240 Had the Munro Court so inquired, it 
may have concluded that Washington could have ensured that 
ballot-qualified third-parties enjoyed a reasonable degree of 
public support by requiring them to submit petition signatures 
equalling one percent of the vote cast for a specified office at a 
specified election. Had the Court reached that conclusion, it 
would also have determined that requiring such parties to win 
one percent of the primary vote in order to gain ballot access 
was unnecessary to the State's aims and unduly burdensome to 
the parties. 
In Burdick, the Court acknowledged that "voting is of the 
most fundamental significance under our constitutional 
structure."241 The Court nonetheless proceeded to observe 
that states' interests in assuring that elections are operated 
equitably and efficiently is so important that not every barrier 
tending to limit the field of candidates from which voters may 
choose warrants strict scrutiny.242 Not surprisingly, the ma-
jority concluded that the prohibition on write-in voting imposed 
only a slight burden on First Amendment rights and was ale-
gitimate means of preventing losers of primaries from contest-
ing general elections. It was also held to be a legitimate means 
of preventing party raiding.243 
In rejecting strict scrutiny, the Court declined in Burdick, 
as it had in Storer, American Party and Munro, to inquire whe-
ther the means employed to realize the State's ballot law goals 
were the least restrictive means available.244 Had the majori-
ty conducted that inquiry, it quite possibly would have conclud-
ed, as Justice Kennedy did in dissent, that "[i]f the State de-
sires to prevent sore loser candidacies, it can implement a 
narrow provision aimed at that particular problem."245 Specif-
ically, Hawaii could have invalidated write-in votes cast for in-
dividuals who had been unsuccessful primary candidates. 
This inquiry might also have led the Court to conclude that 
Hawaii created its claimed "party raiding" threat by permitting 
"open" primaries and the least restrictive means of negating 
240. Cf Norman, 112 S. Ct. at 705; Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 
185. 
241. Bendick, 112 S. Ct. at 2063. 
242. Id. 
243. ld. at 2066-67. 
244. ld. at 2063-64. 
245. ld. at 2071. 
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that threat would be to restrict participation in each party's 
primary to voters registered with that party or, perhaps, to 
permit each party to do so. That inquiry would perhaps have 
also caused the Court to conclude that permitting write-in 
voting helped, rather than hindered, Hawaii's interest in in-
formed voting. 246 This is because a voter who votes for a per-
son who, in the manner of most write-in selections has not ac-
tively campaigned, is arguably more, not less, likely to be well-
informed.247 Finally, more careful scrutiny may well have 
produced the conclusion, which Justice Kennedy drew, that 
Hawaii had failed to explain how write-in voting increases the 
likelihood of election fraud. 248 
The Supreme Court should unreservedly apply strict scru-
tiny in ballot-access and write-in vote cases, and insist that 
state-imposed limitations be the least restrictive means avail-
able of pursuing compelling state interests. In returning to 
strict scrutiny, the Court would reaffirm the importance it has 
historically accorded rights of third parties to ballot access and 
the rights of voters to support those parties. In Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), the Court stated: 
Any interference with the freedom of a party is simulta-
neously an interference with the freedom of its adherents. All 
political ideas cannot and should not be channeled into the 
programs of two major parties. History has amply proved the 
virtue of political activity by minority, dissident groups, who 
innumerable times have been in the vanguard of democratic 
thought and whose programs were ultimately accepted.249 
In Williams, the Court observed that "[t]he decisions of 
this Court have consistently held that 'only a compelling state 
interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's consti-
tutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amend-
ment freedoms."250 
A return to strict scrutiny would also reaffirm the Court's 
adherence to the principle of the "equal liberty of expression" 
that is inherent in the First Amendment. In Moseley, the peti-
tioner, who picketed peacefully near a school while carrying a 
246. !d. at 2072. 
247. ld. 
248. ld. 
249. ld. at 250-51. 
250. 393 U.S. at 31 (citing NAA.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1965)). 
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sign protesting "black discrimination," sought to enJOin en-
forcement of an ordinance that prohibited picketing within 150 
feet of a school during school hours.251 The challenged ordi-
nance contained an exception for peaceful picketing of any 
school involved in a labor dispute. 252 
The Supreme Court, with Justice Marshall writing for the 
majority, struck down the ordinance as a violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.253 Justice Mar-
shall wrote that "there is an 'equality of status in the field of 
ideas,"'254 therefore "government must afford all points of 
view an equal opportunity to be heard."255 That is, "govern-
ment may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it 
finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less 
favored or more controversial views."256 Hence, any time, 
place or manner restriction that selectively excludes speakers 
from a public forum must survive strict scrutiny to ensure that 
it is the least restrictive means available of furthering a com-
pelling state interest.257 Because an election ballot is "the su-
preme political forum,"258 the principle of equal liberty of ex-
pression announced in Moseley "guarantee[s] a place on the bal-
lot to anyone who meets the qualifications of the office in ques-
tion unless the exclusion of that person is necessary to achieve 
a compelling state interest."259 
As a practical matter, a return to strict scrutiny would 
ensure that ballot access and write-in voting restrictions are 
legislative responses to real threats against the public's inter-
est in fair elections, not perceived threats against the 
legislators' incumbency.260 This is because judges using strict 
scrutiny would require states seeking to justify ballot access 
restrictions on the basis of a need to preserve stable two-party 
politics to demonstrate why the already stable two-party sys-
tem that dominates the politics of most states requires the 
251. 408 U.S. 92 (1972) at 93-94. 
252. !d. at 94. 
253. !d. at 95-96. 
254. [d. at 96 (citing A. Meiklejohn, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CON~'TITUTION AND 
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1948). 
255. !d. 
256. !d. 
257. See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First 
Amendment 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975). 
258. ld. at 59. 
259. !d. 
260. B. Smith, supra note 9, at 217. 
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assistance of ballot restrictions on third parties.261 If the two-
party system promotes political stability in the United States, 
it will likely survive, with or without such restrictions.262 
Moreover, judges would likely consider the possibility that 
easing ballot-access restrictions would be the most effective 
means of fostering political stability "by providing a release 
valve for the expression of views and pressures that would 
otherwise go unheard."263 At the very least, they would prob-
ably conclude that less restrictive means, such as run-off elec-
tions, are available for preserving a state's interest in political 
stability.264 
Judges employing strict scrutiny would also be likely to 
require states seeking to restrict ballot access to "serious" can-
didates to define seriousness in a reasonable way.265 They 
might well decide that, short of excluding fictitious or fraudu-
lent candidacies, the measure of a candidate's seriousness 
should be left up to the voters on Election Day.266 Those judg-
es would also likely conclude that states could more effectively 
and more appropriately serve state interests in educating vot-
ers and preventing voter confusion by disseminating informa-
tional pamphlets concerning candidates and their public policy 
views, than by restricting ballot access. 267 
In so doing, they would breath new life into the Supreme 
Court's powerful observation of nearly thirty years ago in 
Reynolds v. Sims,268 "the right to vote freely for the candidate 
one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any 
restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative 
government. "269 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Political scientists and legal commentators have incorrectly 
criticized Supreme Court jurisprudence in ballot access cases 
261. Elder, supra note 2, at 391. 
262. !d. 
263. !d. at 392. 
264. !d. at 394. 
265. !d. at 396. 
266. See Chris Hocker, Legal Barriers To Third Parties, 10 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
Soc. CHANGE 125, 130 (1980-81). 
267. Elder, supra note 2, at 399. 
268. 373 U.S. 533 (1964). 
269. !d. at 555. 
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for inconsistency and for hostility to the two-party system.270 
A careful review of High Court ballot-access decisions reveals 
that the Court has consistently favored the First and Four-
teenth Amendment interests of third parties and independents 
only when the challenged ballot restriction bore no rational 
relationship to a legitimate state interest.271 
The Court has been equally consistent in upholding ballot 
restrictions that bear even minimal relationship to legitimate 
state ends, even where those restrictions constrain constitu-
tional freedoms unduly and unnecessarily.272 In the latter 
cases, the Court's decisions have directly benefitted the two 
major political parties by making it more difficult for third-
party and independent candidates to challenge Democrats and 
Republicans in general elections.273 The Court should reverse 
that trend by subjecting state restrictions on ballot access and 
write-in voting to strict scrutiny and by insisting that those 
restrictions be the most narrowly tailored means available of 
achieving compelling state interests.274 
270. See supra note 2. 
271. See supra discussion at pp. 34-36. 
272. See supra discussion at pp. 36-42. 
273. ld. 
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